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Editor`s Note: An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated that Banker White is based in the UK. A BRICK HOUSE COLLAPSES IN THE VILLAGE OF Veselovka, Russia, a few kilometers from Kaliningrad. It is said that Immanuel Kant had something to do with this house when the area was part of Prussia (and when Kaliningrad was known as Königsberg), but this is not clear exactly. Ambiguities such as whether the philosopher really lived here did not prevent someone from considering the house as his own and providing him with the statement КАНТ ЛОХ. These words, sprinkled with green and garnished with a groovy heart and a pretty flower underneath, were translated into the English-language media as „Kant is an idiot.“ A Maricopa County official told ESPN that the delay in la Russa`s indictment occurred because the incident was originally filed in a fake jurisdiction. Strangers often mistakenly believe that he is not aware of his surroundings. One possible form of experience, Kant shows us, is the „relationship.“ This means, above all, that the relationship as we live it is never a quality of things in itself or Noumena. None of the other categories are inherent in Noumena either. In fact, Kant is very specific in this regard, saying that these categories have been „carelessly transformed from criteria of thought into properties of things themselves.“ 3 It is technically wrong to say (as Harman and his followers do) that Kant imagines things as already correlated, that is, already related to the subject, or that objects wait for the subject to absorb and exhaust their qualities, so to speak. Nothing like that. In fact, Kant`s main suggestion here is that objects are only partially correlated with our mind, and only if they make themselves available to our experience.

One rarely hears the words irony and kant used in the same sentence, but what is ironic about this vandalism is the fact that the house is not Kant`s, the existing structure dates back to the nineteenth century. Only the foundations are at the same time as the philosopher who lived in the area in the late 1740s. What we have here, I think, is a vivid illustration of how criticism of Cantob, whether inscribed in graffiti or formulated in academic prose, usually misses the mark. You`ll often hear contemporary critics say that Kant is an idiot because he has this or that failure of himself, but this assessment almost always involves a misinterpretation of a misidentification of his philosophy, so to speak. In such cases, the foundations of Kant`s system remain intact and solid as never before. You see, even in death, Kant is the reigning All-Destroyer The All-Crushing, as his friends called him, tearing him apart for his unfortunate habit of ending debates completely unscathed and triumphant. The first round of quality control tests appears to have used a bad test protocol, and when the last round of tests under the right protocol showed a 33% failure rate, nothing was done. A higher criminal court ruled that the first trial had improperly considered the evidence and alleged inconsistencies in his testimony.

For anyone involved in writing and editing, GMEU as an office reference will prove invaluable. Garner illustrates with real examples, cited with chapters and verses, all the linguistic errors to which modern writers and speakers are subject, whether in the choice of words, syntax, phrasing, punctuation or pronunciation. No matter how well you know your path, you are sure to learn from every page of this book. The terms Cant are also given incorrectly, and overall, the work bears the appearance of a hasty and pirate compilation. The epistemological movement of object-oriented ontology is to say that object relations are conceivable because they are real, even if they are removed and unrecognizable. Realism is obviously what one might call this philosopher, as Harman puts it, „a strange realism.“ But realism (strange or not) is a view of the world, a human point of view that requires the world to be accessible to us and structured in such a way that we can think so. Here, Harman`s ten minerals turn out to be equivalent to Kant`s forms of „possible experience.“ These ten modes guarantee in advance that, for example, an object somewhere at a certain time will be „sincere“ to another object, or that an object somewhere in three days will be „confronted“ with another object. Even if we are not there somewhere in Ohio and we observe an object indifferently „theorizing“ another object, we can know that objects do things with other objects and will continue to do so behind our backs.

Now, one could say that Harman simply extended the Kantian forms of possible experience to objects that experiment with other objects in various ways. This would be partly true, because according to this philosophy, the objects themselves have experiences, as you will see below. But there is more: the fact that we can also think about these object relationships means that the relationships are already conceivable, already correlated with our mind and therefore already something we know about the world. The much-maligned „correlationism“ that object-oriented ontology hopes to derive from its thinking is indeed its most remarkable characteristic. Amid all the excitement about object-oriented philosophy, no one stopped to understand how the discussion of these new terms for relationship is supposed to radically improve the concept of „relationship“ in the history of philosophy. The problem is that the original sins of the „relationship“ are not clearly represented in Harmans and his followers, except for frivolous remarks about poststructuralist relationality, systems theory, and human observation. It is really not necessary to overturn the concept of relationship in the superficial way of object-oriented ontologists, because there is already much in the history of philosophy since Aristotle to teach us that the relationship is not always human or correlational, reciprocal or even fixed or permanent, or anything other than a „moment“ of relationship, which always disappears by becoming and dying. This is why the philosophers of the late Middle Ages often distinguished between relational reality, relationships between all entities except human perception, and relational rationing, the relationships we established in our inspection of the world. Kant, for his part, knew that the relationship is not only aesthetic (which Aristotle derided as the „saying“ of the relationship; that is, that this relationship is what we make of it).

On the contrary, he understood that the problem of the relationship is exactly the same as the problem of the thing itself: there are relationships in the noumenal world, but we cannot think about it directly because we only have access to phenomenal relationships, the imperfect representations of noumenal relationships. In other words, the human version of the relationship is not the same as the noumenal relationship and is not the only type of relationship. This idea runs through Kant`s lectures in metaphysics, which none of the object-oriented ontologists seem to know. The object-oriented ontology program has even more to offer. Every object, whatever it is, is abstract in the same way. Each corresponds to a template: all objects have interior and exterior spaces, interior and exterior spaces, depths and surfaces, and especially essences and accidents. Here, in the idea of the ontologist of the object, another contradiction in philosophy is revealed. As Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze have shown, each in their own style, the construction of the interior/exterior in any ontology, whether objects or subjects or both, is a function of the old subject-object dualism, which is a dualism precisely because there is a sovereign subject who proclaims what makes the cut. what qualifies or does not qualify as an object and whose perspective on that object determines what is „inside“ and what is „outside“. The fact is not that object-oriented ontology unconsciously centers an autonomous subject at the heart of objects, simply in the way it tells us to look at objects. On the contrary, Heidegger had already created a philosophy whose real purpose was to destroy these old ontological constructions of essences and accidents, inside and out.

Such terms, he thought, hinder the right thought of existence or the existence of being there in the moment. This is important because object-oriented ontology claims to be a Heideggerian philosophy based on passages chosen in Being and Time (1927). Similarly, the reader (i.e. Harman), who was able to discover a pattern for „quadruple“ objects in Heidegger`s opaque essay „The Thing“ (1950), had to neglect this philosopher`s poetic discussion of the jug in the same work, as well as his warning against realistic perspectives on objects: „Science represents something real by which it is objectively controlled. But is this reality the jug? No, not at all. 13 It should be noted that Wang had previously wrongly predicted democratic victories. Federal data is also wrong for Urbana District 116, according to Deputy Superintendent Todd Taylor. At this point, one could raise one`s hand and simply admit that Kant was right: there are relations of objects, yes, but we cannot really know them or describe them in detail, but only allude to them in our inevitable human way. Or you could go on, attributing these considerable naming difficulties to the language problem and solving them by taking a page from Heidegger who uses neologisms to refresh the enriched language of philosophy, but who really wants to hear more jargon? You could also consult your local analytic philosopher, who will tell you that metaphysical errors are errors in natural language: artificial languages, anyone? In any case, object-oriented ontology as a philosophy may want to decenter man, but as a language and force as a way of thinking, it extends the human in all relationships, raising serious political and ethical questions, but never answering them.